Chương 162: CHAPTER ONE HUNDRED AND SIXTY-TWO: WHAT THE LAW ALLOWS

The discussion that followed ran three hours and produced, by its end, something that Marcus recognized as the council operating at the level it had been built to operate at. Holloway laid out the legal terrain. Vellenmoor's charter permitted an accused to be represented by "any person of standing willing to speak on their behalf" — an old provision, common in northeastern township charters, dating from a period when literacy was rare and the accused frequently could not read the charges against them.

The provision had fallen into disuse in most jurisdictions because the practical infrastructure for representation didn't exist. It had not been repealed.

"Person of standing," Vance said.

"Defined how?"

"Ambiguously," Holloway said.

"Which is our opening. In practice it has meant a landholder, a guild member, or a cleric. There is no explicit prohibition on a representative from outside the jurisdiction." He paused.

"There is also no explicit permission. It has never been tested because it has never come up."

"So we'd be arguing for the interpretation as well as arguing the case," Chung said.

"Yes," Holloway said.

"Two arguments. The first is a procedural argument that the representative is admissible. The second is the substantive defense." He paused.

"If we lose the first argument, we never reach the second."

"How likely are we to win the first argument?" Marcus said. Holloway thought about it with the care of a practitioner giving an honest assessment rather than a reassuring one.

"Depends entirely on the magistrate," he said.

"A magistrate who wants to conduct a fair proceeding will admit the representative because the alternative is a proceeding where the accused cannot speak for herself. A magistrate who has already decided the outcome will find the procedural grounds to refuse." He paused.

"I don't know the magistrate."

"I might," Yara's relay came through — forty minutes delayed, the operator reading it aloud from the transmission sheet." Vellenmoor magistrate. Name is Aldemar Kessling. Appointed six years ago. My eastern contacts have mentioned him twice, both times in the context of commercial disputes involving eastern trading houses. Reputation: rigid, procedurally exact, not corrupt. Not sympathetic — exact. He follows the charter as written." Holloway's expression changed slightly.

"Procedurally exact is good for us," he said.

"A procedurally exact magistrate reads the charter and applies what it says. The charter says any person of standing. It does not say any person of standing from within the jurisdiction." He paused.

"Rigid is dangerous on the substance and helpful on the procedure." The story has been illicitly taken; should you find it on Amazon, report the infringement.

"Who goes?" Marcus said. The question landed in the room and sat there.

"Not you," Vance said immediately.

"The Warden of a foreign sovereign entity appearing in a township court transforms the proceeding into a diplomatic event. Kessling would refuse on grounds of jurisdictional impropriety and he would be right to."

"Agreed," Marcus said. He had already reached the same conclusion.

"Holloway."

"I'm the obvious choice," Holloway said.

"Northeastern legal culture, six years of practice in adjacent jurisdictions, capital case experience from before." He paused.

"I'm also a foreign advocate with no local standing, and my known association with the march means that if Kessling wants to refuse me, he has an easy justification."

"Then who?" Price said.

"Calla," Danny said. The room turned. Danny had been quiet for most of the three hours. He had been listening in the particular way he listened when he was building something — not waiting for a gap in the conversation but assembling a picture that would be useful when it was complete.

"Explain," Marcus said.

"Two arguments," Danny said.

"The procedural one and the substantive one. Holloway is the strongest advocate for the substantive argument — the medical facts, the standard of care, the question of whether the death was caused by the treatment or by the underlying condition." He paused.

"But the procedural argument isn't a legal argument, exactly. It's an argument about what a court is for. Whether a proceeding where the accused cannot speak in her own defense is a proceeding at all."

"And Calla makes that argument better than Holloway?" Vance said.

"Calla makes that argument differently than Holloway," Danny said.

"Holloway makes it as a practitioner citing the charter. Calla makes it as someone who grew up in a legal system that was built specifically to prevent that failure." He paused.

"The advisory opinion she wrote for the provincial court — the methodological note at the end. The one you said you wouldn't have written." He looked at Vance.

"That note is the procedural argument. She already knows how to make it." Vance was quiet.

"She's twenty," she said.

"She's the best legal mind this territory has produced," Danny said.

"And she has something Holloway doesn't have, which is that she is entirely unthreatening. A twenty-year-old woman from a market family arguing that a court should let an accused person speak is not a foreign power intervening in a township's affairs. It's a young advocate making a procedural point." He paused.

"Kessling is rigid. Rigid people react badly to pressure and well to precision. Calla is precise and applies no pressure at all." Marcus looked at Holloway.

"Assessment?" he said. Holloway thought about it for a long moment.

"He's right," Holloway said.

"I hadn't considered it because I've been thinking about who has the most experience. He's thinking about who fits the specific situation." He paused.

"Both of us should go. Calla makes the procedural argument. If she wins it, I make the substantive one — or she does, if she's ready by then and wants to."

"She'll want to," Danny said.

"Then we ask her," Marcus said.